

4
1959

DEMOCRATIC PROGRAMS FOR ACTION

Foreign and Military Policy
for Peace and Security

A series of ten pamphlets

No. 4

**The Military Forces
We Need
And How to Get Them**

Published by Authority of
THE ADVISORY COUNCIL
of the
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
1028 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D. C.



Price 10 Cents

THE ADVISORY COUNCIL
of the
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE

Members

Jacob M. Arvey
Paul M. Butler
Hugh N. Clayton
Katherine M. Cullinan
Mrs. Benjamin B. Everett
Orville L. Freeman
Foster Furcolo
Camille F. Gravel, Jr.
Leo C. Graybill
W. Averell Harriman
George M. Harrison
Hubert H. Humphrey
Ione Hunt
Estes Kefauver

David L. Lawrence
Herbert H. Lehman
Stephen L. R. McNichols
Margaret Price
Calvin W. Rawlings
Thelma Parkinson Sharp
Adlai E. Stevenson
Mrs. Lennard Thomas
Marguerite Peyton Thompson
Harry S. Truman
Raymond R. Tucker
G. Mennen Williams
Paul Ziffren

Consultant

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt

Administrative Committee

Paul M. Butler, Chairman
Thomas K. Finletter

Henry H. Fowler
Charles S. Murphy

Philip B. Perlman

Executive Director

Charles Tyroler II

THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN POLICY

Members

Mrs. Eugenie Anderson
Jefferson Beaver
William Benton
Barry Bingham
Chester Bowles
James B. Carey
Benjamin V. Cohen
Angier Biddle Duke
Irving M. Engel
Silliman Evans, Jr.
Abraham Feinberg
Miss Dorothy Fosdick
Charles B. Gary
Dr. Philip C. Jessup

Chairman
Dean Acheson

Estes Kefauver
S. Ralph Lazrus
Herbert H. Lehman
Dr. Harvey C. Mansfield
Edward G. Miller, Jr.
Dr. Hans J. Morgenthau
David J. McDonald
James G. Patton
Edith Sampson
Thelma Parkinson Sharp
Dewey David Stone
G. Mennen Williams
Stanley Woodward

Vice Chairman
Paul H. Nitze

These pamphlets are prepared under the authority of the Advisory Council. They are in furtherance of the most ancient and the most vigorous tradition of the Democratic Party—to bring about the widest discussion and understanding of public questions, and participation in forming Party policy. They do not necessarily reflect the precise views of all members of the Advisory Council.

July, 1959

The Military Forces We Need and How to Get Them

Our Object Which Lies Beyond War And Weapons

JUST ninety-six years ago, in its General Order 100, the War Department stated the function of military force. "Modern wars are not internecine wars in which the killing of the enemy is the object," so the order read. "The destruction of the enemy, in modern war, and, indeed, modern war itself are means to attain that object of the belligerent which lies beyond war." In our new era of nuclear weapons it is all the more essential that in determining our military strategy, and the weapons with which to carry it out, we know clearly the objects of this nation which lie beyond war and the weapons of war. Once we know that, it will become apparent that some weapons, under certain circumstances, will be far better suited than others to further it.

What is this object? Is it self-preservation? Surely, in the last and most desperate eventuality. But there is much—and of the greatest importance—to be sought and defended short of that eventuality. What this is we may sum up as the maintenance of a world environment in which nations seeking, as we are seeking, to develop in their own way, free of dictation from others and without imposing our will on others, may survive and flourish. Putting it another way, our object is a workable system of free states, with the military force necessary to protect them, with the arrangements necessary for their economic development, and with sufficient community of ideas and purposes to hold them together. For it is only in this sort of world environment, it is only as a member of such a group of free states, that we Americans, and others as well, can continue to live according to our most cherished values.

Why this is so we have discussed in our first two pamphlets. In our third pamphlet we discussed errors in

policy which have made the way harder than it had to be. In the fifth we outline an economic foreign policy necessary to the end just stated. In this pamphlet we discuss the military forces we need in the world as it is today, and as it is likely to continue to be for some time.

In this present-day world, military power is an essential prerequisite both for the security and survival of our free world environment and for any negotiated settlement of differences with the Sino-Soviet power. If the Communist powers are able to enforce their will, they have no need to adjust their interests to what they refer to as a condition of co-existence with what they dislike. Furthermore, we believe that the possession of power which cannot be coerced is the best hope of going beyond the settlement of specific differences to a broader agreement that would progressively relegate the reliance upon force to the background. Our long-range objective is the reliable and effective control and regulation of armaments. We do not see how this objective can be achieved if the Russians, in the absence of agreement, are to be conceded unchallengeable superiority in the instruments of force.

The military forces and strategy we outline here are not an alternative to negotiation of differences and mutual reduction of armaments. They are the best means to those ends as well as to some measure of security.

A Further Analysis Of The Free World Environment

In the free world environment we seek, many other states and peoples than our own play essential, though varying, parts. The very spaciousness of the environment is a significant quality. Furthermore, in the maintenance of it, the factors of military strength, economic vigor, and political unity are all necessary to support one another in accomplishing the end sought.

The indispensable center of the economic and military strength of this group of free states is the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe. The survival and development of free nations will rest upon the strength and unity of this central core. This, in turn, means that the freedom of Western Europe from Soviet domination is essential to preservation of this core. Without Western Europe as part of it, no strong and free group of nations will exist. On the contrary, should Western European production be available to the Soviet Union, it could extend its hegemony over Asia and Africa, perhaps even over South America. Under these circumstances this nation could not be preserved in anything like its present form. This point is strongly brought out in the first two pamphlets.

This conclusion does not depreciate the importance of other areas outside the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe. Obviously the Middle East, with its oil and as the crossroads of East-West and North-South routes, South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Far East, and Africa are all associated with vital interests of a free world system. It would be disastrous should any of these areas now free be detached from the free and open world and be added to the closed

Table of Contents

The Military Forces We Need And How to Get Them

	Page
Our Object Which Lies Beyond War and Weapons	3
A Further Analysis of The Free World Environment	3
What Military Strategy Is Called Upon to Do	4
The First Priority Is to Assure Nuclear Adequacy	4
The Consequences of Nuclear Parity	5
Limited Nuclear Warfare or Withdrawal	6
The Nub of Policy	7
The Line for Invention and Innovation	9
Military Needs Which Might Arise in the Near East and Asia	9
Needed Forces and Their Cost	10
Can We Afford Such a Cost?	12


Soviet Communist system. But the prime disaster would be to have this happen to Western Europe, if for no other reason than that it would greatly enhance the likelihood of its occurring in the other areas as well.

In the discussion which follows we shall, for purposes of clarity, consider first what military forces we need to defend the central core of free world strength, and then ask whether these forces are also of the type and scale to meet emergencies elsewhere in the world.

What Military Strategy Is Called Upon To Do

As the world situation clarified after the Second World War, it was plain that the only militarily aggressive power was the Soviet Union (to which we must now add Communist China). The Soviet Union maintained a vast ground army and rejected all attempts to obtain international control of atomic weapons and limitation of arms. Instead it proceeded vigorously to develop its own nuclear armaments and submarine fleets. The Soviets also showed every intention of pushing their control westward into Europe and of breaking the connection between North America and Western Europe by forcing American troops and bases out of Europe.

NATO was the response to this threat and pressure. The problem that NATO military had to solve was that Western Europe needed security without being destroyed to get it. It needed not the promise of liberation after conquest, but security against conquest. The most likely form of conquest in 1949 was along the line of the take-over of Czechoslovakia, a Communist revolution supported by the presence or the threat of Russian troops, and Russian troops were present in large numbers in Eastern Germany and Poland.



The Chips Are Down

The St. Louis Post-Dispatch

At this time the United States had a monopoly of nuclear weapons. So the earliest NATO strategy rested on the sound belief that a small (compared to Russian forces) Anglo-American-European ground and air force would deter any surprise invasion of Western Europe aided by Communist uprisings, while the United States Strategic Air Command (SAC), with its nuclear weapons, promised to counterbalance the Russian superiority in ground forces in the event of a large-scale invasion.

Today, this belief is no longer valid. In the first place, British and French forces in Europe, since 1951, have been decreased, not increased. The German contingent, slow as it has been in developing, is now the numerical equal of the British, larger than the French, and soon will furnish more manpower than all the rest of the European nations in NATO's important center army. This primacy causes political concern among the European allies. So what we have is a NATO force too small, and politically unbalanced.

In the second place, there has been a radical shift in the balance of strategic nuclear power—involving both the weapon and the means of delivering it. Not only has Russia broken the American monopoly on the weapon, but it is dangerously ahead on long- and medium-range missile delivery. The Secretary of Defense concedes that on present expectations the next three years will give the U.S.S.R. a superiority over the United States of three to one in intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Even this gloomy statement may be optimistic. If present programs of production are maintained on both sides—and there have been no decisions to change the U. S. program—the U.S.S.R. may achieve a capacity to destroy U. S. retaliatory power at a risk which they might regard as worth running. To put the matter more graphically: Russian missiles, raining down on SAC aircraft and missile bases, could end our capacity to retaliate, much as a knight in armor was rendered powerless when he was knocked off his horse and could not get to his feet again. Clearly, such a relative disadvantage in military strength would downgrade our capacity to deter war or prevent Soviet blackmail.

The First Priority Is To Assure Nuclear Adequacy

It should be obvious, therefore, what our first priority should be. It is to make certain with all possible speed that we have, and then to maintain, a position of adequate nuclear strategic strength vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. By adequate nuclear strength we mean the situation in which the other side, even with the great advantage of the first blow, cannot be confident of its ability so thoroughly to destroy our nuclear forces that it need not fear a retaliatory blow more damaging than it is willing to accept. If the U.S.S.R. also maintains such a posture, we can say that a situation of effective nuclear parity exists between the two countries.

Unless we maintain nuclear adequacy, it makes little difference what other weapons we produce. Either they would be knocked out before they could be used; or, better yet from a Russian point of view, the mere existence of her clear military supremacy could achieve diplomatic victories—i.e., changes in the conduct of peoples—without the use of that power. For without raising the statistics of the

matter to the level of a universal law of history, there is overwhelming evidence to show that peoples and governments quickly adjust themselves to the reality of unopposable power.

Nowhere is this more likely to be true than in the case of nuclear weapons about whose catastrophic effects all peoples are vividly aware. If there were pretty solid evidence that the Russians could disarm or incapacitate the U. S. at a risk acceptable to them, then all Asians, most Europeans, and a pretty sizable number of Americans would be prepared to act on the evidence without inviting proof.

It is imperative to proceed with a program of dispersing, hardening, and adding mobility to our strategic deterrent systems. The surest deterrent to an all-out strike against us would be the conviction on the part of the Russians that their first strike could not destroy an overwhelming proportion of our retaliatory delivery systems.

In striving for nuclear adequacy, we must always set our goals high enough to permit a "margin of insurance" to cover faulty intelligence reports and possible rapid advances achieved by the U.S.S.R. without our knowledge.

The Consequences Of Nuclear Parity

Even if, by some great good fortune, the Administration should throw off its lethargy and decrease the vulnerability of our strategic nuclear power, in view of the natural, technical, and industrial resources of the Soviet Union, we cannot count upon achieving more than nuclear parity with her. This situation has far-reaching consequences. The first of these is the impact upon the deterrent effect of strategic nuclear forces.

If one power has nuclear weapons in plenty, and the means to deliver them against another power's homeland, while the latter has none, it is pretty clear that the latter is not likely to attack the former. This is the situation, ideal from the point of view of the possessor of nuclear weapons, which is known as "nuclear monopoly." Some aspects of this situation existed between the United States and the U.S.S.R. from 1945 to 1949. We did have a monopoly of nuclear weapons. But those we had were few in number and of small power by today's standards; nor did we have very effective means of delivering those we had at intercontinental ranges.

There is another possible situation: one power may have nuclear weapons in large numbers and may have perfected the means to deliver them, while another power also has nuclear weapons and delivery means but one or both in substantially inferior numbers and quality. Again, the latter country is not very likely to attack the former. This situation, which can be described as a state of "nuclear advantage" or "predominance," really did exist around 1953-1955. For after the development of the H-bomb, and the completion of our force of B-36 intercontinental bombers, and B-47 jet bomber force with overseas bases, the United States did achieve a position of overwhelming superiority in strategic nuclear force. Even though the Soviet Union was building up its weapons stocks, and was beginning to develop a long-range jet bomber force of its own, it was most unlikely that the Soviet Union would have considered attacking the United States, or any of our allies. She could

have been punished severely with nuclear weapons without being able to strike back effectively.

The deterrent effect which our superior nuclear forces had upon Soviet policy in this situation has been called "active deterrence." It reached beyond protecting us against direct attack and modified the conduct of the potential aggressor in other ways. It was this "active deterrence" which the Administration was exploiting when it announced the national strategy described by the press as "massive retaliation." This laid upon the Strategic Air Command the task of defending our allies everywhere, as well as the United States, against threatened Communist attack. Even then, however, the Soviet Union, though still relatively weak in nuclear weapons and delivery means, had significant capacity for administering nuclear destruction, particularly against our allies in Western Europe, which she might have used if pushed to the wall. This capacity on her part set limits on the use we could make of our "active" deterrent. Its positive utility was limited. This possession of nuclear destructive capacity limited to last-resort use if threatened with attack or after actual attack has been called "passive" deterrence.

It was our "active" deterrent power which diminished as the Soviet Union grew in nuclear strength. There was, of course, nothing unforeseeable about this, particularly after the Russians mastered the H-bomb in 1953. It explains why "massive retaliation" turned out to be such a perishable strategy. For, in the state of nuclear parity, "active deterrence" is attenuated, if not lost altogether, and powers in the state of nuclear parity retain largely "passive deterrence," deterrence against direct attack. This rests upon the aggressor's belief that a direct attack, which does



"I Keep Seeing Spotniks Before My Eyes, Doctor"

not destroy his victim's power to retaliate, will bring back upon him unacceptable damage. At the same time, the "active" aspect of the deterrent weakens as the prospective user of strategic nuclear weapons contemplates the unacceptable damage to his own country which the use will surely bring down upon it.

Furthermore, as we permit the Russians to achieve a lead in strategic missiles, *their* deterrent power becomes increasingly "active," while our strategic force continues to lose what "active" significance remains to it. If we permit the Russians to achieve a decisive missile superiority, so that we cannot even be sure of our ability to administer a telling second strike, not only will our strategic power be stripped of its "active" significance, but also even its ultimate value as a "passive" deterrent will be placed in jeopardy. That is why it is of first importance that we have the position of parity in strategic power that seems quite possible if we make the effort.

Add to this weakening deterrent power of our strategic nuclear force the additional fact that the Russians, along with the development of formidable strategic nuclear force of their own, have maintained, modernized, and mechanized their vast land force, and have equipped it with "tactical" nuclear weapons, and the full extent of the Western dilemma appears. Because of the mortal danger of Russian nuclear retaliation against the United States, the strategic nuclear power of the United States no longer furnishes to Europe the protection it once offered against the Russian land forces. Yet it was precisely while this change was occurring that the Administration committed this country to increasing dependence upon the deterrent power of our strategic nuclear forces and, by some strange madness, set about reducing our own land forces to pre-Korean strength—an example which had cumulative effects when the British and French reduced their contribution to Western Europe's local defenses.

The last defense program submitted by the Truman



The Louisville Times
"Forty-Five Minutes From Broadway"

Administration recognized the perishable quality of our "active" deterrent. It called for total military strength of 3.5 millions, with an Army of 21 ready divisions, an Air Force of 143 wings, a Navy of 409 major combat vessels in active fleets (including 16 carrier groups), and a Marine Corps of 3 divisions. This was the defense program at which the present Administration took its "new look" during 1953 and 1954. The results of this jaundiced reassessment will all be in by June 1959, by which time our forces will be almost precisely one million weaker. The Army will by then have 14 divisions, many of them sadly under-strength and all cursed with the obsolescence of their weapons and equipment. The Air Force will have 102 wings, having taken reductions in all elements not directly related to the strategic deterrent. The Navy and Marines will have 389 warships, which have also suffered from obsolescence, and 3 divisions, now under-strength.

With the dependence that can be placed upon our strategic forces declining because of growing Soviet nuclear strategic power, and those forces we might employ to fill the gap being reduced for budgetary reasons, the stage is being set for a major tragedy. In this situation, two anti-theoretical and equally bad policies have found some supporters.

Limited Nuclear Warfare Or Withdrawal

Spelled out to its fullest stretch, limited nuclear warfare means that the Soviet Union and the United States, as the two super-powers, will come to an unspoken understanding that, since atomic weapons are far too dangerous to use against each other, they would treat each other's territory as privileged, but would wage any atomic war on European soil, amid European peoples and European cities. If the aim of American policy is to preserve the people and civilization of Europe as essential to the existence of a free world, limited nuclear warfare is not the way to do it. Or again, if the aim of American policy is to develop strategic conceptions which our allies will support because those conceptions correspond to *their* own interest, then again, limited nuclear warfare has little place in such conceptions.

Those who are tempted to believe that a strategy of limited nuclear war would somehow bestow advantages upon our numerically inferior forces, should reflect upon the following considerations. All the best authorities are convinced that limited nuclear war will require more, not fewer, military forces at any particular level of effort. This is because there must be greater reserves in proportion to front-line troops, in order to make provision for the higher level of casualties expected; it is also because the supporting services in the rear of the combat zone must be more widely dispersed, which will inevitably require an increase in support strength.

It follows, of course, that limited nuclear war is not and cannot be *cheaper* than limited conventional war at any particular level of effort. More manpower and more widely scattered and secure supply and communication facilities spell greater expense. It also follows, for both reasons, that NATO cannot overcome its relative weakness, vis-a-vis the forces on the other side, by the simple expedient of committing itself to the use of nuclear weapons. On

the contrary, the commitment to nuclear weapons inevitably increases the relative advantage of the other side—provided Russian forces are also equipped with nuclear weapons, as we know that they are, and provided the Russians and their satellites continue to be willing to maintain larger forces under arms and to spend a greater amount upon arming them.

That is not to say, of course, that we can expose our forces to Communist nuclear attack while they are prepared to defend themselves only with conventional arms. It does mean that, as there is no military advantage for NATO forces in resorting to nuclear weapons, and as there are decided political disadvantages in it, the nuclear weapons with which our forces in NATO are equipped should be regarded as serving the purpose of deterring the Russians from using *their* nuclear weapons in a limited attack. This must be their primary function; their employment in actual combat must be secondary, to be resorted to only if the Russians themselves initiate the use of nuclear weapons, or if the circumstances should, unhappily, lead to a general war.

Some of those who see that a strategy of limited nuclear war in Europe will not strengthen or unify the trans-Atlantic coalition, suggest going to the opposite extreme. They despair that military power—except possibly nuclear strategic power—can play a part in keeping Western Europe from being dominated by Soviet power, and so advocate withdrawing American forces from Europe. This they put forward, in what they consider a nearly hopeless situation, as a step toward, rather than the result of, a solution of the fundamental issues which exist between the Soviet Union and the Western powers regarding Europe.

Now if, as we have pointed out above, the aggregated strength of Europe and North America is necessary to withstand Soviet purposes in Europe, then to withdraw American participation in the defense of Europe is to insure that there shall be no effective opposition to the Soviet will in Europe. But, one may ask, will not the threat of American nuclear retaliation be sufficient protection to Europe? We have already pointed out that in a condition of nuclear parity it will not provide this active deterrent. It is not sound strategy to rely on any nation's willingness to destroy itself in order to aid its allies—particularly when, at the same time, it would in all likelihood insure the destruction of its allies as well.

Withdrawal of American forces from Europe may well be possible—indeed we earnestly hope it will be—when a settlement of outstanding issues and a more stable power relationship have been achieved in Europe. But to attempt it under present circumstances would be, as we point out below, to destroy the possibility of reaching those settlements, that relationship, and, indeed, of preserving a free Western Europe.

The Nub Of Policy

The answer, then, to our dilemma is not to be found—if we want to maintain a coalition of free powers—by a plan of fighting small nuclear wars in our allies' territory. It is not to be found by withdrawing from our alliance, and leaving our friends, whose preservation is essential to ours, without a defense against Soviet domination. Where,

then, is it to be found? It is to be found, we believe, in increasing the hazards to the Soviet Union in using its land forces, until such use is as full of danger as using nuclear force in the first instance.

Only by such a strategy, if it can be devised, will Russia's vast lead in land forces be met and a real incentive be given to the Soviet Union to move toward the control and limitation of armaments. How might this be done?

If an increase in defense forces available in Europe were combined with a vigorous new flow of scientific and military invention, these smaller defensive forces could be made, for some time at least, more nearly the military equal of a larger aggressive force. This has happened before and it can happen again. What is needed is a substantial strengthening of the European, British, Canadian, and American ground and tactical air forces assigned to NATO or in strategic reserve available to support NATO. These forces should be prepared to defend Western Europe with conventional weapons, but should also be equipped with sufficient nuclear firepower to deter the Russians from using their tactical nuclear weapons. Once these forces are in existence, then our strategic nuclear forces—if strongly pushed—will again take on some of the character of active deterrence. For if it were clear that any hostile military action against Western Europe could and would be contained for some time, the aggressor would face formidable problems.

Let us look for a moment at the risks which a prospective aggressor must face. We may assume that he has tried atomic blackmail—that is, he has sought and failed to achieve his political objective, whatever it may be, by



The Greensboro Daily News

Push-Button Defense

intimidating his elected victims with the threat of nuclear destruction. If the political objective of his aggression is restricted to Western Europe, he will want to make certain that the military action planned when he launches his attack will be limited, and will appear to be limited, to Western Europe. Above all, he will desire to minimize the chance of the military action being so extended that it may involve the destruction of his own homeland. He has, then, two choices: he can attack either with conventional weapons alone, or with nuclear weapons as well. In either case he must be careful to make the limited character of his purpose evident. But he will want to get the action over with quickly, and, to do this, he must employ force decisively superior to the defense he expects to encounter. This is where he runs into difficulty; and it is by exploiting this difficulty that we may hope to deter him without matching his forces, man for man, tank for tank, and A-bomb for A-bomb.

The aggressor's problem is that if the defense is substantial it is extremely difficult to launch an attack against it that is *both* overwhelming *and* convincingly limited. Against a relatively weak defense, which the improvidence of its members during recent years has now given to NATO, the aggressor may believe that a quite restricted attack would promise quick success. It is because they are inclined to agree with this that the NATO military authorities feel that NATO has no choice but to fall back immediately upon the strategic deterrent, hoping that the threat of strategic nuclear retaliation in case of attack will be sufficiently credible to deter the aggressor. But if his objective is a strictly limited one (and if it is not, he is not likely to bother with Europe, but will attack the United States directly), he may reason that the threat is a bluff. For he knows, and knows that NATO knows, that what Western Europe stands to lose if his limited attack is a success, at least if it is a conventional attack, is incomparably less than what Western Europe stands to lose in a strategic nuclear war. If this is his reasoning, he may proceed with his attack, hoping to overwhelm the weak defense and obtain his objective while the NATO governments are trying to steel their souls to a nuclear holocaust.

Suppose, however, that the defense is not weak. Suppose it is strong enough so that to be sure of winning he must undertake a major mobilization of his forces, must move millions of men around, disrupt his economy and the economies of his allies, and expose his vast forces to military counteraction by concentrating them in the forward areas behind the line of attack. A strong defense will force this action whether the aggressor is planning a purely conventional assault or is planning an assault with tactical nuclear weapons, so long, that is, as he does not throw aside all pretense of limited action and use his own strategic nuclear forces. Such a concentration would, indeed, be required to attack a NATO force of even thirty divisions, which is General Norstad's minimum objective for the central front (the Alps to the Baltic).

Would the aggressor take such a risk? He would know that a vigorous and sustained defense, such as a NATO force of this kind could put up, would raise tensions to the point where he would have to be prepared to use his strategic nuclear weapons in a pre-emptive strike against North America to forestall a first blow against him by the United States which, in circumstances of mounting tension,

must be fearing just such a pre-emptive blow. In short, the *minimum* action required to achieve his objective would be so great that the chance of limiting the ensuing action would appear small.

In this situation, where the aggressor's calculated design is a limited operation to achieve a specific objective, and not the annihilation of the victim, it would be foolish for the aggressor to contemplate the use of nuclear weapons, assuming that both sides have them for "tactical" use. To be sure, an aggressor would be likely to threaten the use of nuclear weapons in the hope of intimidating his prospective victims into concessions or surrender. But if this should fail, as we have assumed, he would see that to use them would be disastrous for a very simple reason: their employment would make any ensuing action all the harder to limit by making it vastly more destructive, more fluid, and consequently more unpredictable. In other words, even a conventional assault upon a strong NATO central-front defense would result in a war of such dimensions that the aggressor must regard it as a poor risk. A nuclear assault would be a far poorer risk. In addition, assuming that the aggressor really had a limited objective he wanted to achieve, it seems rather unlikely (though it cannot be ruled out) that he would want to see the objective destroyed in the process of conquest.

Why, then, cannot NATO rely upon a nuclear defense and thereby get along with fewer troops? The reason has already been indicated. The aggressor might still make a conventional attack and thus defy the Western powers to take the responsibility for submitting Europe to the destruction of nuclear war. If they failed to make this stoic decision, he would have a good chance both of limiting the conflict and of winning by throwing his overwhelming conventional forces against their weak defenses. If they *did* make the decision to use nuclear weapons, which he must of course follow, his force would still be overwhelming. But the decision to initiate the use of nuclear weapons would be most difficult for the NATO governments since it would offer Western Europe no military advantage to compensate for the immensely increased destruction and loss of life that would have to be anticipated.

This is why it is vitally important that NATO's local defense forces be increased in strength. A defense dependent upon the willingness and ability of the NATO governments to employ nuclear weapons in a war of unlimited violence lacks credibility. The aggressor may well believe, if this is NATO's only alternative to a limited setback, that NATO might yield him his limited objective rather than incur the risk of virtually unlimited destruction.

It seems clear, then, that a sound military policy for the Western alliance requires two efforts, each of considerable magnitude. We have already pointed out one, the essential and urgent tasks of restoring our strategic nuclear striking power. Hardly less important is it to rebuild and modernize—or rather "futurize"—our own forces available for service in Europe which the present Administration has treated with even greater neglect.

Our allies, as we noted earlier, have done no better. For a variety of reasons, European governments have not

raised and maintained in Europe the troop strength necessary to perform the deterrent function we have just outlined.

In this situation, if ingenuity could find a way greatly to increase the effectiveness of Western forces relative to Soviet forces, this would both increase the effective strength of the troops which could be raised, and, at the same time, increase the will to raise them.

The Line For Invention And Innovation

While one group of scientists, soldiers, and industrial establishments is working to restore our strategic nuclear striking power, we urgently need another group working in a wholly different direction. The latter should escape from the fascination of nuclear weapons and think of functions to be performed, of purposes to be served, before they think of weapons. They should not so much be seeking a lucky find, a wonder weapon, as a stream of invention, together with the totally new military tactics and strategy appropriate to it.

Let us illustrate a little more specifically how our NATO forces, which will still be inferior in numbers even after they have been strengthened as we suggest, could increase their effectiveness.

The Confederate leader, Nathan Bedford Forrest, is reported (no doubt apocryphally) to have explained his tactics as "gittin' thar fustest with the mostest"—men and weight of firepower. Stonewall Jackson handled several times his own forces when he was running rings around Pope and Hooker. The Germans, in the blitzkrieg attack in 1940, sliced through far superior French forces because they had developed new tactics and an entirely new concept of mobility in ground warfare.

For NATO purposes mobility requires the ability to move rapidly on the ground without being tied down by a heavy logistic "tail" and without being confined to improved roads. It requires also the capacity to move men and supplies by air without the limitations and vulnerabilities that go with dependence upon prepared airfields. It should not be impossible to make both these capacities available. The technical devices are already available; what is required is the imagination and the determination to make use of them.

Increased firepower possibly lies in guided and self-guiding missiles. The technical problems may be great, but they are still not incapable of solution. With the need for these inventions by scientists and engineers goes the need for tactical innovation comparable to the blitzkrieg concept which, marrying armor, motorized infantry, and the dive bomber, gave Guderian his Ardennes victory over the French in 1940.

In the meantime, and for the foreseeable future, the need for greater close air support controlled by ground forces is clear. This was demonstrated in the ground action in Korea.

Another tactic which has always aided an inferior force is the capacity to break up concentrations and the use of massed forces. This capacity is commonly

attributed to the massing of firepower, but need not be the same. The Mongol herdsman, with the tree saddle that enabled him to shoot the horn bow from horseback, retired the war chariot from the battlefield. The English longbowman made the knight and horse in armor obsolete. The little anti-tank missile, which two or three men can carry and fire, and is guided electrically through a fine copper wire it reels out as it seeks its target, may do the same for the armored monsters upon which the nations of the world have spent so many millions in recent years. There are means of preventing concentrations, which need not, like nuclear weapons, have consequences beyond the battle and the battlefield. By all these means, a proper marriage of invention and tactical innovation may greatly increase the effectiveness of the smaller force.

A word of caution is necessary. A modern regimental combat team could play havoc with Hannibal's army. But this would not be so if Hannibal's army were equipped with the same weapons as the regimental combat team. Weapons and tactics are, in time, likely to be equally available to powers that are substantially equal in other respects, as indeed they were between the two world wars. But the advantage to the more imaginative and energetic side is constant. It is the stream of invention and innovation that is needed to win battles—as the armies of Nazi Germany proved, first against France and Britain, and later against Soviet Russia as well, until they were finally overwhelmed by sheer numbers.

Our problem contains another difficulty. The success of many innovations depends on the secrecy of their development. They come as surprises to an unprepared enemy. But for our purposes, it is important that the potential enemy should know and respect the strength of the smaller force. We want to deter an attack, not invite one. The function of the still-to-be-discovered weapons is not so much to win a major test of strength in Europe, but to make the risk of starting one exceed any foreseeable gain. For this reason enough must be known about the strength of the new forces and weapons to evoke respect.

Military Needs Which Might Arise In The Near East And Asia

The weapons which the United States needs for possible use by its own or friendly forces outside Europe are, we suggest, of the same character as those broadly described in the last two sections. The considerations which lead to this conclusion are closely related to those already mentioned.

Our purpose in the Near East and Asia is to support the development of independent and viable nations. Such nations are necessary to the environment of an open and free world. The greater part of our support to them must lie in political and economic action. This important aspect of our policy is discussed in Pamphlet No. 5. But these countries, along with others, exist in a world in which military power throws its shadow before it, and in which, as the unprovoked attack against the Republic of Korea demonstrated only too clearly, military force can be used for aggressive purposes. There is, therefore, a defense problem in the Near East and Asia which cannot be dealt with solely through political and economic measures. In

this pamphlet, we deal only with the military aspect of our policy to the Near East and Asian countries.

Again the changing nature of the nuclear relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is fundamental to present and prospective defense problems in Asia as it is in Europe. When our nuclear position was such as to support a policy of active deterrence, this placed limits on the extent to which the U.S.S.R. or Communist China could push with military force against our interests in Asia. If we were to fail to maintain a position of nuclear parity with the Soviet Union, the situation would be reversed. There would then be definite limits to the support we could give countries on the periphery of the Soviet bloc even in defense against overt military aggression across recognized boundaries. Therefore, from the standpoint of Asian defense, it is mandatory, as it is in the case of European defense, that we do whatever is necessary to assure ourselves of continuing nuclear parity.

But even under the assumption of continuing nuclear parity, the defense problem of Asia is different from what it was in the days when we could rely heavily upon active nuclear deterrence. It is no longer credible that we would employ nuclear weapons in defense of the countries on the periphery of the Soviet-Chinese bloc in Asia except under the most extreme conditions, conditions indicating a Communist intention of making a general military assault against the West. Any such general assault initiated in Asia is, however, unlikely.

The more likely military threat to the Asian countries on the periphery of the Soviet-Chinese bloc is from military pressure in a limited area, and from forces employing non-nuclear weapons. The first defense against such pressure is from the military strength of the country directly involved. It is for this reason that military assistance to the countries directly threatened, such as the Republic of Korea, Formosa, Vietnam and Iran, is of continuing importance.

The second line of defense is United States air, sea, and ground forces quickly available, in adequate numbers and with appropriate weapons to give support primarily with non-nuclear weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons should also be available to our forces, but only for the purpose of deterring the aggressor from using nuclear weapons himself. Just as in Europe, it is hard to see how a war in Asia fought with nuclear weapons by both sides will give us any substantial military advantage. With limited port facilities and few airfields, we have more to lose than to gain by initiating the use of nuclear weapons on an Asian battlefield. Not only is there no probable military advantage to us in doing so, if such weapons are also used by our enemies, but also no political objective favorable to our side could be supported by the nuclear destruction of countries we are trying to defend. Many have deluded themselves with the escapist thought that we alone have the capability or will to introduce nuclear weapons into an Asian battlefield. It is hard to believe that the Russians would in fact give us such an easy out in a period of nuclear parity.

It should further be pointed out that deterrence of military attack, although it must rest primarily upon relative military capabilities, does not rest solely upon such

equations. There would be exceedingly heavy political cost to the U.S.S.R. or to Communist China if they were to launch a large-scale military attack upon any of the Asian countries. This does not apply to Quemoy and Matsu, where our support of Chiang's continued occupation of these islands is not believed to be supportable either on political or military grounds by much of Asian and of world opinion. But any military attack against other areas in Asia or the Middle East would have such heavy political costs that substantial local forces plus U. S. military back-up on the scale outlined in the next section should go far to assure the defense of the areas threatened.

Needed Forces And Their Cost

It should be perfectly clear that while the Administration's "new look" has been disastrous, a return to some "old look" would be equally so. The national defense would have been farther advanced today if it had evolved taking full account of the Korean war experience. The aimless detour through "massive retaliation" resulted in ever-increasing dependence upon the strategic nuclear advantage, which passed almost as it was claimed. The task now is to retrieve the consequences of that folly. No longer can economizing be put above national security in the belief that nuclear weapons can accomplish all. We are forced to make intelligent accommodation to the two great changes that have occurred on the military scene since 1953.

These changes, which have already been recognized in earlier parts of this pamphlet, are, first, the technological revolution which has mounted nuclear warheads upon ballistic rockets of intercontinental range; and, second, the strategic revolution implicit in Soviet maturity as a nuclear power. Taken together, these changes constitute a challenge to American effort and ingenuity which cannot be met in the spirit of "business as usual." They require fundamental rethinking of our defense problem. They require executive leadership with the energy to grapple with the real issues and to make the necessary decisions. The confusion, bickering and red tape which today beset the Defense Department and our armed services spring more from lack of decision, or from decisions made arbitrarily with no sense of strategic purpose and direction at the top, than from interservice rivalry. Once the basic decisions consistent with a coherent strategic approach have been made, organizational changes can follow which will bring organization into closer alignment with the functions to be performed and thus greatly increase the efficiency of our defense effort.

In the long run large sums can be saved through more rational organization and a reduction in the present muddle and red tape. Furthermore, the redirection of our effort suggested in this paper may well require the curtailment or even the abandonment of some current programs of defense production with consequent savings. In sum, however, all the possible savings cannot be expected to offset the increased defense expenditure which is essential to make up for the neglect and blindness of recent years.

Now for the specifics. As pointed out earlier, our first priority is to recover with all possible speed the position of parity in strategic nuclear force we are losing because

of Soviet achievements in missile design and production. The present situation leaves us no sensible alternative but a crash effort to bridge the "missile gap." To this end SAC's aircraft and missiles should be given greater protection against the blast and heat effects of atomic attack, should be further dispersed, and should be given such active defense (primarily by anti-aircraft missiles) as developing technology makes possible. Also, the capacity of SAC to support an airborne alert should be improved, with greater urgency than at present.

Three other immediate steps are also urgent: First, increase production of jet tankers required to reduce the dependence of our strategic bombers on overseas bases that are threatened by Russian intermediate-range missiles. (This would wring the last measure of benefit from our present manned-bomber forces before they finally become obsolete.) Second, double the combined Atlas-Titan missile production currently programmed, and increase the rate of production of these missiles; also reduce their vulnerability by increasing the dispersal and hardening of their bases. Third, do not terminate, but continue, development and production of the airborne cruise missiles (such as Snark and Regulus II). These weapons could be produced in large quantities, maintained at dispersed locations and made mobile, at relatively low cost. Though vulnerable to the enemy's AA missile defenses and manned interceptors, they would increase his defense problem, particularly if they made their final approach to target at low altitudes at which the range of detection radars is short.

So much for the gap-fillers. For the next phase, the production lines for all the solid-fuel missiles that are in advanced stage of development—Pershing, Polaris, and Minuteman—should be laid out so that production may proceed promptly once the prototypes have been proved. (This was done in the case of the B-47 bomber, in the case of Atlas, and in other instances. It has cut at least two years from the cycle, design to use.) Also, mobility of these missiles should be stressed. At the same time the construction rate of the Polaris submarine should be increased. The development of the Nike-Zeus anti-missile missile should continue to be given high priority.

Added together, these new programs will call for an impressive additional expenditure of about \$4 billion more a year on our strategic forces. At the same time, however, savings of about \$1 billion could be made elsewhere in Air Force expenditures. For example, as the result of programs launched several years ago, when the Russian long-range bomber was believed to be the major threat to the United States, we are annually spending about \$6 billion on anti-aircraft defense—for interceptor aircraft, for AA missiles, for early warning and target acquisition radars, and for the immensely complex defense coordination system known as SAGE. Meantime, however, the Russians have cut the production of their long-range bombers in order to shift resources to the production of missiles.

Of course the Russian long-range bomber force remains a threat, and this threat would increase in proportion to any weakening of our AA defense. We have already noted the continuing requirement for active defense of SAC bases. But these programs of AA defense have not been adjusted to the change in Soviet priorities. Take, for instance, the continued high expenditures on manned

interceptors. The interceptor has become a platform for air-to-air missiles which are placed in position to fire and are fired by electronic controls partly on the ground and partly in the interceptor, while the pilot monitors the operation. In most cases the job can be done better and more cheaply entirely from the ground with ground-to-air missiles. And in a few years the principal active defense requirement will surely be defense against missiles, not against manned bombers.

Similarly, bombers, like interceptors, are becoming platforms from which missiles are fired. Again, it seems reasonable to insist that the missile, in time, should go all the way. New planes for special purposes, including both supersonic bombers and long-range interceptors, may be justified. But neither should be built and maintained at vast expense if their principal justification (in competition with missiles) is to give airmen something to fly in. Years ago General "Billy" Mitchell pointed out a similar truth about the battleship.

At the moment an acute shortage of air crews limits SAC's ability to maintain an airborne alert. An early curtailment of interceptor forces, by permitting the release of interceptor pilots and support personnel for service in the bomb wings, would ameliorate this problem during the remaining useful life of the bomber forces. Since there is also a need for increased capacity to transport our ground troops and their supplies by air, this, too, might be facilitated by the release of interceptor pilots. The Administration has already begun the reduction of fighter-bomber wings on the assumption that close support for our ground forces can be better provided by their own short-range missiles. We do not propose that this substitution be carried farther at this time; we do propose the application of the



The Atlanta Constitution
*'Now This Is Our Latest Budget . . . Which, of Course,
Is Obsolete . . .'*

same principle—the substitution of missiles for manned aircraft—to air defense.

So much for Air Force programs, which, through SAC, contribute more than 90 per cent of the strategic deterrent. The Navy will increase its contribution to the strategic deterrent when its Polaris missiles and submarines become available. The Navy also needs strengthening in capacity for anti-submarine warfare because of the vulnerability of the United States to missiles fired from hostile submarines.

The Army has suffered most grievously from the military policy is the provision of adequate "tactical" forces to deter local aggression aimed at limited objectives, and to defend our interests when this local deterrence fails. This is, in the nature of things, largely the province of the Army, but the Navy also has an essential role in it. To perform that role the Marine Corps should be restored to full strength and thoroughly "futurized" in arms, tactics, and transport. Carrier task forces for local, limited actions should be in constant readiness. The Navy also needs special-purpose shipping for the rapid movement of ground forces overseas.

Current programs to increase carrier task forces for their contribution to the strategic deterrent cannot be justified in competition with alternative weapons systems. Money can be saved here to pay for the modernization the Navy urgently needs to improve its readiness. Consequently, major increases in the Navy budget, other than those for Polaris missiles and submarines and for stepped-up anti-submarine warfare capability, are not necessary.

The Army has suffered most grievously from the neglect and blindness of the Administration. To modernize its currently authorized force of 14 active and 7 high-priority reserve (mainly National Guard) divisions the Army needs an additional \$1.5 billion annually. This would provide no increase in personnel. But it is essential to make the most of the forces we now have: for example, by enabling the Army to re-equip itself over a five-year period with the new light rifle and machine guns, with the new and greatly improved armored personnel carrier, and with the advanced communications equipment that has been developed. It also would enable the Army to purchase aircraft of better types for those functions for which it is now authorized to operate aircraft. It would, in short, enable the Army to reverse the present trend by which it grows steadily weaker year by year. This is the minimum necessary.

It is not enough. We need a larger Army, both to uphold our interests around the world, and to relieve us from intolerable dependence upon the threat of strategic nuclear action for deterrent purposes. Without this evidence of our determination it is surely useless to expect our allies to make the effort required of them, particularly in Western Europe.

To achieve these ends, to reverse the cuts which the Administration has made, and to provide the minimum force that the Army needs if it is to meet its responsibilities, will require an additional 225,000 men and an additional \$1.5 billion a year. This will provide an Army of 19 divisions (total strength about 1,100,000), with eight

divisions (instead of three as at present) in condition for immediate movement and employment overseas. Such an Army is essential if we are to adjust our military strength to the strategic revolution brought about by Russian maturity as a nuclear power.

To sum up these proposals in budgetary terms. In very general and approximate terms, the combined Air Force programs (the gap-fillers plus the accelerated ICBM programs plus additional air transports) would require a net annual increase in the budget of \$3 billion. For the Navy an additional \$1 billion would be needed annually. Army needs (\$1.5 billion for modernization plus \$1.5 billion for five more divisions) would total \$3 billion annual increase. The entire effort would add \$7 billion to the defense budget. If allowance is made, as it undoubtedly should be, for additional funds for research and development to meet the challenge of Soviet power with imagination, ingenuity, and innovation, then the forces we need would require additional defense expenditures for the next four or five years of approximately \$7.5 billion annually.

Can We Afford Such A Cost?

There can be no question of the capacity of our economy to support this addition to defense expenditures. We are currently devoting less than 10 per cent of our Gross National Product to major national security programs, including Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and mutual security (foreign aid). During World War II we diverted almost 45 per cent of our then substantially smaller total product to war purposes, and yet our economy continued to grow all during the war. Economists of both political parties now agree that the American economy can and should grow about 5 per cent per year, after we have fully recovered from the recession, which is not yet the case. This growth would add to our total national production more than \$23 billion a year as a starter. The diversion of one-third of this productive increment to the great priorities of national security would more than cover a \$7.5 billion annual increase. The Administration's insistence that a balanced budget at current, or reduced, tax levels must come before the provision of essential defense needs indicates that new thought on the national economy is as essential as is new thought on the national defense. This will be the subject of pamphlets in a series being prepared by our Advisory Committee on Economic Policy.

This is the fourth of a series of ten pamphlets on Foreign and Military Policy for Peace and Security. Also in preparation is a complementary series on Domestic Policies For a Growing and Balanced Economy, one of which has already been issued.

Copies of these pamphlets, as they are published, may be obtained from The Advisory Council of the Democratic National Committee, 1028 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D. C. Prices: For less than 100, 10 cents each; 100, \$7.50; 1000, \$65.00.