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**United States Cultural Influences on the English-Speaking
Caribbean during the Twentieth Century**

by

**Franklin W. Knight
The Johns Hopkins University**

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Dr. Jorge Heine
Director of CISCLA
Inter American University of Puerto Rico
P.O. Box 5100
San Germán, Puerto Rico 00753

ABSTRACT

United States Cultural Influences on the English-Speaking Caribbean during the Twentieth Century

Starting from a definition of culture that emphasizes its material elements—as opposed to the semiotic approach used by Clifford Geertz and other social scientists—this paper examines United States cultural influences in the Commonwealth Caribbean. This influence has been parallel to U.S. economic expansion in the Caribbean and forms thus an integral part of “Manifest Destiny.”

In practice, this expansion has come together with the modernization forces that have swept the Caribbean nations in this century, making it often difficult to distinguish between “modernization” and “Americanization.” The British tradition and its *Weltanschauung* and social mores, and the different levels of economic development existing in countries like Jamaica or Barbados *vis-à-vis* the United States have tended to set limits to U.S. cultural influence—but powerful elements like Caribbean migration to the United States, U.S. tourism in the region, the communications revolution and the impact of U.S. economic assistance have all made their mark on Caribbean culture.

The Anglophone Caribbean is steadily being Americanized; however, it is far from being American; “West Indians remain West Indians and not duplicates of John Wayne.”

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Johns Hopkins University

Introduction

At the beginning of the twentieth century the United States of America was already well established as a major political and economic force in the world.¹ After the end of World War I, the United States became a military power, and by mid-century it was a superpower sharing its universal hegemony with the Soviet Union. If American arrival at the position of military superpower was accidental, its domination of the Western Hemisphere—to the degree that this could be asserted—was calculated and controlled. Spurred on by what Emily Rosenberg has called “the ideology of liberal developmentalism,” American economists and politicians saw first the hemisphere and then the world as their oyster.² It was “Manifest Destiny” reinvigorated with technological muscle and atavistic self-assurance.³ The twentieth century was to be the age of American domination. “Liberal developmentalism,” wrote Rosenberg, “merged nineteenth century liberal tenets with the historical experiences of America’s unique historical time and circumstance into developmental laws thought to be applicable everywhere...a universal model.”⁴

While the Americans have never ceased in their attempts to export their “universal model,” the successes have been quite varied in their own self-defined “Mediterranean,” the Caribbean

¹In 1899 the United States ranked fourth in the world as an exporter of manufactured goods (behind the United Kingdom, Germany and France). By 1929 the United States ranked third. By 1950 it had overtaken Great Britain as the leading exporter of manufactured goods. See William Woodruff, *Impact of Western Man: A Study of Europe’s Role in the World Economy, 1750-1960* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1967), esp. 273-4. On the military and political position of the United States, see David F. Trask, *The War with Spain in 1898* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1981).

²Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream. American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 7. See also Akira Iriye, “Culture and Power: International Relations as Intercultural Relations,” *Diplomatic History* 3 (Spring 1979): 115-128.

³According to A.W. Palmer, *A Dictionary of Modern History, 1789-1945* (London: Penguin Books, 1964), 209, “Manifest Destiny” was the phrase coined by Americans to justify territorial expansion, and probably originated in an unidentified article in *The United States Magazine and Democratic Review* of July 1845 which referred to “the fulfillment of our manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions.” It had wide general currency during the nineteenth century especially during the Mexican War however. Ramón Eduardo Ruíz credits its origin to John L. O’Sullivan of the *New York Morning News* in December 1845. See R. Eduardo Ruíz, “Manifest Destiny and the Mexican War” in *Main Problems in American History*, volume 1 edited by Howard H. Quint, Milton Cantor and Dean Albertson (3rd ed.; Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1972), 254-60, where Palmer’s source is identified as O’Sullivan, document 13.3, 270-2.

⁴Rosenberg, *American Dream*, 7. See also, David Healy, *U.S. Expansionism. The Imperialist Urge in the 1890s* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970); and Mira Wilkins, *The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad, 1914-1917* (Harvard, 1974).

region.⁵ Where American political influence was strong, such as the older independent states of the region—Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the Central American Republics—and those acquired by war or purchase such as Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, the Americans could attempt massive physical transformations by force.⁶ (The same was true for the Philippines.) The physical transformations were necessary prerequisites for the efficacious penetration of American capital, American techniques, and American methods. The material culture and the non-material culture became inseparable in the American mind. “Expressed in idealistic terms,” wrote Lester Langley, “the vision of Caribbean empire in the American mind consisted not of colonies, as European powers had carved out in Africa, but of small republics with honest governments and stable economies. If they lacked republican traditions, as did Cuba, then a republic must be created, by Cubans but with proper consideration for those republican credos cherished by Americans. If they suffered from factious political rivalries, as did Central America, then rules of behavior must be established, by Central Americans but with proper deference to the United States to identify—and if necessary to penalize—the rule breakers. If they were heavily indebted to foreign creditors, as was the Dominican Republic, then a financial reordering was necessary, by Dominicans but with proper respect for American recommendations about government expenditure. If their financial future depended more and more on their relationship to the American economy—and in the twentieth century such dependence became more apparent as wars cut commercial and investment links with Europe—then the Caribbean republics must offer the United States and American creditors the economic arrangements most compatible with the American economy. If the location of the republics on the globe gave them immense strategic value, then their governments must ultimately realize that national sovereignty was, of course, important, but not so crucial as the fact that most of the republics lay along the sea approaches to the Panama Canal.”⁷

The relationship with the still colonized parts of the Caribbean during the twentieth century had, by dint of the circumstances, to be different in both degree and in kind than in the early-achieved, nominally independent republics. In these latter the theater of operations was less restricted than within the context of an enduring empire such as that of the British, which, at least until the end of World War I, retained the aura, if not the reality, of military and economic power.⁸ In the hierarchically-structured world view of the leaders of American society, the

⁵Lester D. Langley, *Struggle for the American Mediterranean. United States-European Rivalry in the Gulf Caribbean 1776-1904* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1976).

⁶See Healy, *U.S. Expansionism*; Foster R. Dulles, *The Imperial Years. The History of America's Brief Moment of Imperial Fervor* (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1956); David F. Healy, *The United States in Cuba. Generals, Politicians and the Search for Policy* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963); Lester D. Langley, *The United States and the Caribbean in the Twentieth Century* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1982); Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971); David Healy, *Gunboat Diplomacy in the Wilson Era: The U.S. Navy in Haiti, 1915-1916* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976); Jules Benjamin, *The United States and Cuba. Hegemony and Dependent Development, 1880-1934* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977); María Dolores Luque de Sánchez, *La ocupación norteamericana y la ley Foraker (La opinión pública puertorriqueña) 1898-1904* (Río Piedras: Editorial Universitaria, 1980); Gordon K. Lewis, *Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in the Caribbean* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1963); Cathy Duke, “The Idea of Race: The Cultural Impact of American Intervention in Cuba, 1898-1912,” paper presented at the Fourteenth Conference of Caribbean Historians, San Juan, Puerto Rico, April 16-21, 1982; and Arturo Morales Carrión, *Puerto Rico: A Political and Cultural History* (New York: Norton, 1983), 144-211.

⁷Langley, *The United States and the Caribbean*, 13-14.

⁸See Wilbur Devereux Jones, *The American Problem in British Diplomacy, 1841-1861* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1974); Robert George Neale, *Great Britain and United States*

Anglo-Saxon groups on both sides of the Atlantic, despite their differences, represented the apex of what they perceived and designated as “civilization.” By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Americans were willing, and in some cases most anxious to share what Rudyard Kipling had described as the “White Man’s Burden”:

Take up the White Man’s Burden—
The savage wars of peace—
Fill full the mouth of Famine
And bid the sickness cease;
And when your goal is nearest
The end for others sought,
Watch sloth and heathen folly
Bring all your hope to nought.⁹

But the Americans, despite more than a century of debating and active trading, still had not achieved a coordinated policy of imperial expansion. What is even more, along with the rising current of imperialism went a strong undertow of anti-imperialism, a marked reluctance to confront the realities of power, domination and trade.¹⁰ This division, even in the highest councils of the United States government, accompanies a manifest ambivalence to incorporate politically the diverse peoples of non-Anglo-Saxon lineage. The Monroe Doctrine notwithstanding, the Americans subdued their differences with Great Britain and accepted in principle the *de facto* existence of continued English imperialism and colonialism, as well as the weakening superiority of the English merchant marine, and the more widespread penetration of English capitalism in Latin America.¹¹ But under Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson, the United States moved perceptibly in the direction of building a large merchant marine and establishing itself both as a regional power and as a potential world power.¹²

In the twentieth century, therefore, the world became slowly Americanized, and the cultural penetration of the English-speaking Caribbean was merely a part of the general worldwide trend. It is not surprising that the Anglophone Caribbean should inexorably move into the orbit of the

Expansion: 1898-1900 (Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1966); and Healy, *U.S. Expansionism*, 9-33.

⁹Rudyard Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden” (1888) in *Collected Verse of Rudyard Kipling* (New York: Doubleday, 1910), 225. See also Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny. A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1935), 283-323.

¹⁰See Healy, *U.S. Expansionism*, 213-31.

¹¹A contrary view may be found in Neale, *Great Britain and the United States*, 213-5. My account follows Healy, *U.S. Expansionism*.

¹²According to Healy, *ibid.*, 37, “By the end of the 1890s, the United States had become the world’s first industrial nation, as well as the greatest exporter of agricultural products, and her people were, collectively, the richest society ever known.”

United States.¹³ What is surprising is that the process should be so surreptitiously slow compared to the other parts of the Caribbean, and that the transmission should be so complex.

Part of the complexity of tracing cultural interrelationships derive from the nature of culture itself, and the uncertain way in which it is transmitted, adapted, adopted, and selected. Moreover, political and economic forces invariably exert an impact on groups and their cultures, and the Caribbean region was no exception.

This essay takes as its point of departure the generally accepted view of culture as “the sum total of ways of living built up by a group of human beings, which is transmitted from one generation to the other.”¹⁴ It further assumes that cultures are inherently complex, constantly dynamic, and perpetually changing. Finally, it assumes that transmission is not a linear process, by which some element frozen in time and characteristics, can be located in one place or the other. No attempt is made to engage fully the debate raging for the past decades as to what constitutes Caribbean culture, whether the Caribbean region shares a pan-Caribbean culture, or what are the principal elements of a Caribbean cultural identity.¹⁵ The controversial consensus is that a Caribbean culture area does exist and that it manifests bewildering variations sometimes amounting to recognizable subcultures, sometimes merely demonstrating the enduring historical consequences of imperialism, insularity, class, color and language.

Background and Setting

In order to trace the impact of cultural penetration from the United States, one must initially recognize that both the culture of the donor and the culture of the recipient—in this case the Anglophone Caribbean—share some common legacies and some pronounced differences.

Both the United States of America and the English Antilles trace their dominant cultural heritage to England. The United States severed its imperial connection in 1776, while the English Caribbean began to gain its political independence only in 1962—and the process is still alive and well.¹⁶ The most indelible common heritage of this common imperial experience has been the use of a mutually understandable variant of the English language as the official form of communication. As subcomponents of a common cultural tradition, one might expect some forms of transmission to be facilitated. Notwithstanding, the longer duration of English colonialism in the West Indies created some inhibitors to the receptivity of some aspects of English North American culture. Anglophone West Indians, for example, were remarkably slow to adopt American football, or baseball as popular spectator sports, or to drive on the right hand side of the road, or to use the decimal system of currency, or the metric system of weights and measures (although these cannot be considered to be recognizably from the United States), or to

¹³See Everold N. Hosein, “The Problem of Imported Television Content in the Commonwealth Caribbean,” *Caribbean Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (December 1976): 7-25; Herbert Hiller, “Excavism, Penetration and Response: Industrial Tourism in the Caribbean,” *Caribbean Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (July 1976): 92-116.

¹⁴This is the definition of *The American College Standard Reference Dictionary*.

¹⁵José Luis Méndez, “Problems in the Creation of Culture in the Caribbean,” *Caribbean Quarterly*, Vol. 21, Nos. 1-2 (March-June 1975), 7-19; Gordon K. Lewis, “The Caribbean in the 1980s. What We Should Study,” *Caribbean Review*, Vol. X, No. 4 (Fall 1981): 18-19, 46-48; also, Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

¹⁶In 1962 Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago became independent states followed by Barbados and Guyana (1966), Grenada (1974), St. Lucia and St. Vincent (1979), Belize and Antigua (1982) and St. Kitts-Nevis (1983).

establish the republican form of government.¹⁷ In some of these respects, the non-Anglophone Caribbean have been either less resistant or less discriminating in their adoption of these examples of material culture.

In reviewing the development of this cultural relationship, one observation stands out: North American cultural influences seem to parallel economic and political penetration; and as the major purveyors of an industrialized material culture that influence is irreversible. Nevertheless, two caveats are in order. The first is that many of the material examples of North American culture are no longer exclusively North American, and therefore a tendency prevails which confuses the process of modernization, industrialization and westernization with that of Americanization.¹⁸ Indeed, the cultural symbols we tend to identify as quintessentially pertaining to the United States may now be transmitted via Japan, Europe, or some neighboring Latin American state. The second caveat is that in many ways the initial impression is partially misleading, not necessarily because the Anglophone Caribbean is not moving inexorably toward a North-American norm, but because the present state of the cultural penetration is neither as extensive nor as profound as it appears.

It is also necessary to point out that neither the recipient Caribbean countries nor the donor United States represented cultural homogeneity. Just as different parts of the United States exhibited different aspects of the general culture, different parts of the Caribbean—and indeed, different social classes within Caribbean territories—demonstrated varying receptivity to forms of United States culture. For example, the Southern-based religious organizations such as the Baptists, Methodists and Seventh Day Adventists tended to emphasize and propagate behavioral practices which were distinctly southern variants of the American norm. Not surprisingly, the exaggerated sensibility to race and their emphasis on agricultural and technical skills along the lines of Booker T. Washington's Tuskegee Institute created some problems for their activities both at home and overseas. The upwardly mobile and aspiring middle sectors of the English Caribbean did not view these skills as assets to their expected achievements. In the same way, American military officers were continually involved in incidents of racial conflict throughout the region, generally for failing to understand and appreciate the subtle varieties and local significance of color shadings which were integral parts of the Caribbean reality instead of their broad categorization of the people along the dichotomous terms of their homeland.

Even at the level of material culture, transfer depended on internal Caribbean infrastructural developments. American motorized transport depended on the availability or construction of highways. While this was easier in places such as Cuba and Puerto Rico where American influence was more direct—and the potential for exports considerably greater—road and rail construction in the Anglophone Caribbean required a complicated process of negotiation with British and local authorities which often represented conflicting interests. The introduction of most consumer durable products such as washing machines, refrigerators, television sets, electric radios, electric irons, knives, and hair curlers depended on the availability of electricity. Without this, the Caribbean folk might be aware, but could not share these modern aids to domestic living. Furthermore, since electrification took place first in the cities and only slowly expanded to the countryside, the difference between town and country gradually became more accentuated in the Caribbean. This resulted partly in an increased impetus to move from the rural areas to the urban

¹⁷In 1983 the United States had not uniformly adopted the metric system for weights and measures.

¹⁸The bibliography here is extensive, but the main outlines may be followed in William Woodruff, *The Impact of Western Man*; Ralph Davis, *The Rise of the Atlantic Economies* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1973); and William H. McNeill, *The Rise of the West. A History of the Human Community* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1963).

areas. Nevertheless, the rural to urban migration is a far more complicated process than the simple desire to lead a more leisurely and materialistic lifestyle. In looking at the cultural impact, the high level of generalization reflected in this paper should not be understood to indicate any advocacy of homogeneity of geography, class or nationality.

Indeed, as we have already indicated, compared with the Hispanic Caribbean—especially Cuba and Puerto Rico—the English Caribbean did not attract the aggressive cultural evangelism of the United States at the turn of the century.¹⁹ Instead, United States cultural penetration has been slower, more surreptitious, and less extensive among the English-speaking Caribbean territories. This, of course, is not surprising. Given the persistence of English imperialism and the way in which the United States influence had to be disseminated, the Anglophone Caribbean did not present itself as an area conducive to immediate and extensive North American penetration. But as the hegemony of the United States became apparent after World War I, and as North American politicians and their supporters gained more confidence in their notion of the Americas as their geopolitical sphere of influence, then the Caribbean began to seem more and more as an undifferentiated strategic zone.²⁰ The expanding vision of the Caribbean promoted by military, ideological and economic concerns has continually undergone revisions for purposes of convenience—with the latest convenient version being the novel political label emanating from Washington as “the Caribbean Basin Initiative.”²¹

The means of cultural penetration, however, have been overt as well as covert. English West Indians have been as responsible for the adoption and adaptation of North American ideas, customs and values as North Americans have been enthusiastic about promoting them. Regardless of the means, the degree of receptivity in the Caribbean has been always consistent with the degree of familiarity of the two groups of peoples and the development scale of political and economic interrelationship. And this partly explains why World War II has made a quantitative as well as qualitative difference to the cultural penetration of the United States.

Migration: A Crucial Link

Migration has certainly been a fertile conduit for cultural transmission. From the middle of the nineteenth century West Indians started to travel to the United States in increasingly greater numbers. While a large proportion of these early, pre-1924 Caribbean emigrants to the United States could be classified under the label some sociologists like to use, as “target induced,” yet, like the general pattern of immigrants of the period, the residual community, especially in New York City, grew larger and larger.²² If the English West Indians behaved like the other intrusive

¹⁹See Margaret E. Crahan, “Religious Penetration and Nationalism in Cuba: U.S. Methodist Activities, 1898-1958,” *Revista/Review Interamericana*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Summer 1978): 204-224; also, Oscar Pino Santos, *La oligarquía yanqui en Cuba* (Mexico: Editorial Nuestro Tiempo, 1975).

²⁰Fitz. A. Baptiste, *The United States and West Indian Unrest, 1918-1939* (Mona, Jamaica: ISER, 1978). Also, Fitzroy A. Baptiste, “The European Possessions in the Caribbean during World War II: Dimensions of Conflict and Cooperation,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of the West Indies, 1981.

²¹The most extensive formulation of this idea may be found in “Text of Remarks by the President to the Organization of American States,” February 24, 1982. Mimeograph (Washington, DC: The White House, 1982). See also Franklin W. Knight, “U.S. Relations with the Caribbean,” *Transafrica Forum*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Spring 1983): 15-25.

²²A convenient list of the bibliography on Caribbean migration may be found in Delores M. Mortimer and Roy S. Bryce-Laporte, eds., *Female Immigrants to the United States: Caribbean, Latin American and African Experiences*, RIIES Occasional Papers No. 2 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1981).

immigrant groups—and there is no reason to believe they did otherwise—then the two leading characteristics of this group as a whole were their repetitive return and their industry.²³ Their industry facilitated the successful acquisition of money and on each successive return to their homelands they would introduce material aspects of American culture, often recognized as the visible symbols of their own success.²⁴ While not all “target earner” migrants were successful, those who were illustrated and contributed to the Caribbean image of the United States as the land of opportunity.

“Target earner” migrants formed only a part of the migration stream. Permanent emigrants often maintained their contacts with their homeland and in various ways contributed to the broader familiarity of American life and customs which preconditioned the transfer of North American cultural traits. Before the imposition of the quota restrictions by the United States in 1921, entry to the United States was relatively simple and the steamship lines linking various West Indian ports with the Atlantic seaboard made travel both easy and economical. The rapid development of the banana shipping industry stimulated considerable interest both in the United States and the English Caribbean islands, especially the economically depressed ones like Jamaica and Barbados. North American shippers and marketers were encouraging the expansion of banana plantations on the islands and lowlands of Central America, spearheaded by the United Fruit Company. Indeed, in places like Cuba, Panama and Costa Rica, the United Fruit Company was creating artificial enclaves of North American society structured and maintained on lines similar to the earlier exploitation sugar producing complexes.²⁵ In Jamaica, the United Fruit Company sponsored the Jamaica Banana Producers Association and subsidized the activities of the Jamaica Welfare Limited under the chairmanship of Norman Washington Manley. (During World War II Jamaica Welfare reverted to the government and was renamed Jamaica Welfare Commission.)

The waves of English West Indians who left their homelands to build the Panama Canal, or to work on railroad construction in Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Honduras, or to toil on the sugar plantations of Cuba, often ended up in one of those incongruous American enclaves. The American system offered economic opportunities, and most West Indians who left their homelands left with the primary goal of economic amelioration. Only later, and in retrospect, did some realize that along with their pecuniary acquisition came a set of intangible modifications in their values and their style of life.²⁶ Migrants who left wage rates equivalent to about thirty cents

²³William F. Stinner, Klaus de Albuquerque and Roy S. Bryce-Laporte, eds., *Return Migration and Remittances: Developing a Caribbean Perspective*, RIIES Occasional Papers No. 3 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1982).

²⁴During World War II the Bases Agreement between the United States and Great Britain resulted in the construction of many naval bases throughout the English islands bringing large numbers of Americans and an infusion of capital. Bridget Brereton writes in *A History of Modern Trinidad 1783-1962* (London: Heinemann, 1981), 192: “...the construction of U.S. bases had a tremendous socio-economic impact. Tens of thousands were employed, at wages higher than any known before in Trinidad. Living costs rose sharply, thousands abandoned sugar, cocoa and the established industries, and a great deal of money circulated, creating a boom-time atmosphere in which prostitution and organized vice flourished under people like Boysie Singh, a well known mobster of the 1940s, and gang conflict and violence increased.”

²⁵Oscar Zanetti and Alejandro García, eds., *United Fruit Company: Un caso del dominio imperialista en Cuba* (Habana Ciencias Sociales, 1976); Watt Steward, *Keith and Costa Rica* (Albuquerque: University of New México Press, 1964).

²⁶Franklin W. Knight, “Jamaican Migrants and the Cuban Sugar Industry, 1900-1934: A Preliminary Essay,” unpublished paper presented at *Problemas de transición*, Seminario Internacional, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, June 11-14, 1981. See also Trevor W. Purcell, “Conformity and Dissension: Social Inequality, Values and Mobility among West Indian Migrants in Limón, Costa Rica,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology, The Johns Hopkins University, 1982.

per day in U.S. currency could gain employment in North America concerns from Massachusetts to Panama at wages which often reached two dollars in 1961. They returned with their hard-earned cash, but also straw hats, leather belts with bronze buckles, shoes, steamer trunks and an addiction to American techniques. America as the land of economic opportunity beckoned such famous sons of the Caribbean as Claude McKay who arrived in 1912, Marcus Garvey who came in 1916, as well as Richard B. Moore and W.A. Domingo. If some of them brought a bit of tropical tempo to Harlem (and other places), they also sent a bit of Harlem back to their homelands.²⁷

The impact of the early emigrants and their return flow is extremely hard to measure in cultural terms. Compared to the general pre-1921 migration patterns, the Caribbean-North American stream was small. Accurate figures for returnees and their economic impact are difficult to find. What is certain, however, is that while the 1921 and 1924 U.S. immigration laws stemmed the stream, migrants continued to leave for the United States, although the greater proportion of these were recruited for a definitely contracted period of time.²⁸ The migration laws, the increase in racism in the United States, the collapse of the Garvey Movement and the great depression of the 1930s encouraged the return of many West Indians, including William Alexander Bustamante of Jamaica—though Bustamante’s return probably had no connection to any of these listed factors.²⁹ In Jamaica this return stream of migrants gave an added impetus to the urbanization of the Corporate Area, and indirectly contributed to the labor unrest and political changes of the 1938-1944 era.³⁰

The Impact of Tourism

The more important migration, from the perspective of cultural diffusion, took place after the Second World War. The recovered and expanded Antillean populations, by the convenience of air transport and the attractive concepts of North American life transmitted by radio, especially after the transistor revolution, and the cinema (and later, television) began to return to the United States.³¹ Simultaneously, the post-war North Americans began to discover the beaches and beauty of the islands south of the Bahamas and Cuba. Tourism developed rapidly in Jamaica and Barbados in the 1950s and 1960s, deriving additional impetus from direct government subsidies and coordinated international promotion. As Herbert Hiller demonstrated in his excellently researched and persuasively argued article, “Escapism, Penetration and Response: Industrial Tourism and the Caribbean,” the adoption of tourism “as an instrument of development” has been

²⁷Jervis Anderson, “That Was New York,” *The New Yorker*, June 29, 1981, 55-85; July 13, 1981, 38-79 and July 20, 1981, 42-77. See also Nathan Huggins, *Harlem Renaissance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 53-4; Tony Martin, *Race First. The Ideological and Organizational Struggles of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976).

²⁸See, for example, various recruitment reports in *The Daily Gleaner*, January 2, 19, 22, 23, 1945.

²⁹On Garvey, see Martin, *Race First*; and E. David Cronon, *Black Moses. The Story of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1955); for Bustamante, see George E. Eaton, *Alexander Bustamante and Modern Jamaica* (Kingston, Jamaica: Kingston Publishers Limited, 1975).

³⁰G.W. Roberts, *The Population of Jamaica* (New York: Kraus Reprint, 1979), first published, 1957. Colin Clarke, *Kingston, Jamaica Urban Growth and Social Change, 1692-1962* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975), 91-102.

³¹Between 1900 and 1940 the populations of the English Antilles tended to stagnate or increase very slowly. Large scale emigration was a major factor in the slow or no-growth.

one of the most hotly-debated issues in Caribbean economics.³² When Jamaica established its national Tourist Board in 1954 it opted for the implementation of a nine year old report which “recommended against a prevailing emphasis on accommodations congenial to local scale in favor of the construction of large size hotels. Smaller ones, according to the report, could not support sophisticated management or provide first class service, both accepted as indispensable if the tourist trade was to be established successfully.”³³

The economic benefits of tourism were not the only attractive aspect highly promoted. As late as 1973, despite reservations as to the net value of government-sponsored tourism, the Organization of American States still supported tourism for its general economic, social and cultural benefits. “Millions of tourists traveling from country to country,” it thundered confidently in its pamphlet, *Tourism in the Americas: Road to a Better Life*, “not only help raise the standard of living of the host country but encourage integration of peoples through the interchange of ideas, drinking and eating habits, and styles of clothing.”³⁴ The pamphlet refrained from the mention of marijuana smoking, dope peddling or the popularity of nudity, all of which were concomitants of the expanded tourist industries of the 1960s and 1970s.

Perhaps more than any of the other Anglophone territories, Jamaican tourism was geared to the United States market. Figures produced by Ransford Palmer in *Caribbean Dependence on the United States Economy* show that in 1975 some 75.2 percent of Jamaican tourists came from the United States.³⁵ By contrast, Barbados—the most heavily dependent on tourism of the major English-speaking territories—had 34.0 percent of its tourists from Canada, 25.0 percent each from the United Kingdom and the United States, and 17.0 percent from the neighboring English-speaking islands. Post-independence Jamaica, Barbados and the Bahamas—in sharp contrast to Trinidad and Guyana—made a conscious decision to rely on tourism as an agent of economic growth (see Table 1). Between 1965 and 1975, hotel accommodation in Jamaica expanded from 6,204 beds to 16,607, or almost 168.0 percent. During the same period the tourist trade more than doubled, from 189,000 to approximately 433,000 visitors per year. The emphasis on tourism and its peculiar concentration in Jamaica moved a Canadian visitor to comment that “Jamaica was an island south of its north coast.”

The emphasis on tourism coincided with the period when Jamaica was still forging a national identity. Many leaders in the tourist industry felt that the creation of a comfortable ambience for their guests required the replication of their concepts of what the tourists enjoyed “at home.” Too often that concept was a modified version of the American Holiday Inn, with a fast food outlet a la Kentucky Fried Chicken seductively close to the beach.

The growth of the tourist industry, especially in Barbados and Jamaica, attracted hundreds of thousands of North Americans to the Caribbean. But it also coincided with an exodus of tens of thousands of West Indians to the United States, as the saturation promotion by airlines and travel agencies before the fuel crisis of 1973 pulled ever increasing numbers of passengers on jet planes. The political independence of the major English-speaking islands and major changes in the U.S. immigration laws in 1965 and 1976 accelerated the process of extra-Caribbean

³²Herbert Hiller, “Escapism, Penetration and Response: Industrial Tourism and the Caribbean,” *Caribbean Review*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (July 1976): 93.

³³Hiller, “Industrial Tourism,” 94.

³⁴*Tourism in the Americas: Road to a Better Life* (Washington, DC: Organization of American States, 1973), 1.

³⁵Ransford Palmer, *Caribbean Dependence on the United States Economy* (New York: Praeger, 1979), 26-30.

emigration. Of course, the domestic push factors in the region cannot be easily over-estimated. For one reason or another West Indians began to lose confidence in their local governments or in the continued economic viability of their homelands. They opted to leave permanently in greater numbers than they ever did before. Between 1962 and 1976 immigrants arriving in the USA from Jamaica, Barbados, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago amounted to 245,000 individuals, who, according to Palmer's calculations, accounted for approximately 6.0 percent of the total population of those countries, and about 17.0 percent of their natural population increase. In the case of Trinidad, more than 33.0 percent of the natural increase left their country permanently between 1970 and 1976.³⁶

Emigrants, however, are only a part of the picture. Simultaneously a far greater number of transient visitors or contract laborers left the Caribbean for the United States. The contract laborers, mostly farm workers, made substantial cash remittances to their home countries. In the early 1970s remittances processed through the Bank of Jamaica averaged 44 million Jamaican dollars per year.³⁷ It is reasonable to assume that this vast stream of visitors flowing between the United States and the Caribbean states served as conductors of reciprocal culture transfer. Migration, whether short-term or long-term, certainly served to broaden the exposure of North Americans and West Indians to each other. Regardless of the impact of the experience on the former, for the latter it seemed the more they knew the better they liked the United States—and the more they saw there the more they took home.

U.S. Economic Penetration

Political independence of the leading Caribbean states also facilitated the economic penetration of the area by the commercial institutions from the United States. This, again, was consistent with the progressive expansion of American interest in the region and the gradual withdrawal of the English metropolitan hegemony. But the economic penetration gained even greater impetus from the rapid growth of the import sector of the English Antilles—as, indeed, of the entire Caribbean—and the dominance of U.S. commercial interests in the extractive industries such as petroleum in Trinidad and bauxite in Guyana and Jamaica. By the mid 1970s, the pattern developed of the major societies in the Caribbean being virtually fed by the United States. Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana imported between 77.0 percent and 92.0 percent of their cereals and wheat flour from the United States in 1973. At the same time, food imports ranged from 6.6 percent of total imports in affluent Trinidad and Tobago, to 22.5 percent of total imports in Barbados.³⁸ In Jamaica food imports accounted for between 34.0 percent and 38.0 percent of total consumer goods imports.³⁹

While this dependence on food imports does not indicate that Caribbean cuisine has gone North American, yet the standardization of pre-packaged and pre-processed foods means that both the diet and the form of eating have, at least for the middle and upper classes, moved toward the North American pattern with meals from instant breakfast to instant rice all untouched by human hands in the process of production.

By 1968 the United States supplied 38.6 percent of Jamaica imports and accepted 39.2 percent of its exports. (By way of comparison, the export/import trade with the United Kingdom

³⁶Palmer, *Caribbean Dependence*, 90.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 103.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 33.

³⁹If beverages are included, then the total is 38.0 percent.

was 23.7 percent and 20.4 percent respectively;⁴⁰ and with Canada, 14.4 percent and 9.6 percent respectively.) Twenty years earlier, in 1948, Jamaica exported 3.2 percent of its products to the United States and received 19.1 percent of its imports from that source.

Trinidad has, by virtue of its industrial base, a more varied trading relationship than Jamaica. In 1966 the United States ranked third with 14.0 percent of Trinidadian imports, behind Venezuela (30.2 percent) and the United Kingdom (16.8 percent), and slightly ahead of Saudi Arabia (13.2 percent). The U.S., however, received 34.0 percent of Trinidad exports, followed by the United Kingdom (13.5 percent), the Netherlands (6.3 percent), Sweden (6.0 percent) and Canada (4.1 percent). Eighteen years earlier, in 1948, Trinidad received 32.5 percent of its imports from the United Kingdom; 17.5 percent from Canada; 16.3 percent from the United States; and 12.9 percent from Venezuela. In the same year, the island shipped 42.6 percent of its exports to the United Kingdom; 12.2 percent to Brazil; 9.2 percent to Canada; and 4.2 percent to the United States.⁴¹

Apart from regular commerce, the English Antilles have, since independence, been the recipient of various forms of aid, grants and assistance from the United States, either directly in the form of bilateral agreements, or indirectly through international agencies such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the social and economic agencies of the United Nations. Most of these essentially economic agencies determine their benevolence on political and ideological grounds. In 1983 the Congress of the United States finally passed and the President signed “The Caribbean Basin Initiative bill.” Designed for some twenty-two nation states, the economic aid portion of the proposal has earmarked some fifty percent of its budget for these states: El Salvador, Jamaica and Costa Rica—presumably to keep those states from straying from “the traditions and common values of this hemisphere.”⁴²

The Presence of American Popular Culture

Technology has assisted greatly in extending the cultural values and norms of the United States throughout the Anglophone Caribbean. The cinema has been a major factor in bringing to the masses the most common form of popular entertainment. Most movies shown in all the English islands are probably of American origin. All the movies being shown around the island of Jamaica during the week of January 2, 1945 as advertised in *The Daily Gleaner* were of American origin.⁴³ At that time Jamaicans could view a wide variety of cinematic fare. In Montego Bay, the choice was Betty Grable in “Sweet Rosie O’Grady” or a nondescript in “Canal Zone.” Port Maria and Highgate featured “Claudia,” starring Robert Young. Spanish Town had Lena Horne in “Thousands Cheer.” Christiana had Clark Gable in “Gone with the Wind.” Brown’s Town had Allan Ladd in “This Gun for Hire,” while Savanna-la-mar featured Dana Andrews in “The Purple Heart.” Kingston had six cinemas then, all showing about the same fare as their country cousins.

The cinema has remained the most popular form of entertainment throughout the Caribbean, as it has indeed remained throughout most of the world. According to the Statesman’s

⁴⁰This means that Jamaica sent 23.7 percent of its exports to the United Kingdom and bought 20.4 percent of its imports from the source.

⁴¹Note that minor trading partners are omitted, therefore the percentages will not add up to 100%.

⁴²“Text of Remarks of the President,” February 24, 1982, 6.

⁴³The Daily Gleaner, 4, Columns 5-6. For the early Jamaica movie scene see Morris Cargill, *Jamaica Farewell* (Secaucus, NJ: Cinnamon Books, 1979), 99-104.

Yearbook, Barbados had six conventional cinemas with a seating capacity of 5,040, and two drive-in cinemas with accommodation for 600 cars in 1977.⁴⁴ In that year, Jamaica had 25 cinemas and one drive-in. Guyana had 51 cinemas in 1975 with seating capacity for 38,375. The information for Trinidad and Tobago dates back to 1973, when the count was 762 cinemas and 4 drive-ins. Yet despite the obvious popularity of the cinema, a local cinema industry has not developed to supply the market. Many films are, of course, shot on location throughout the Caribbean but their impact—economic and cultural—remains ephemeral. Nor are there persuasive reasons for the lack of a dynamic film industry such as the Cuban or Mexican. But the experience of Perry Henzell and “The Harder They Come” illustrates some of the problems of reconciling technical success with financial reward.⁴⁵

Radio and television repeat the same dependent history as the cinema. In his extremely informative article of 1976, Everold Hosein discussed the extent and nature of television in the Commonwealth Caribbean.⁴⁶ According to his study done between 1971 and 1976, television—or what the Americans call “commercial television”—had a saturation density of 30 percent of the Jamaican homes, or a set count of approximately 110,000; 15 percent of those in Antigua with 8,000 sets; 707 percent of those in Barbados with 40,000 sets; and 50 percent of those in Trinidad and Tobago with about 110,000 sets. Ever since the inception of local television in 1962, the content has been overwhelmingly imported, with most programs originating in North America. Hosein’s analysis of television content in October 1975 showed that imported television programs accounted for 72 percent of the airtime in Jamaica, 90 percent in St. Kitts-Nevis, 87 percent in Barbados and 53 percent in Trinidad and Tobago. The imported content rises even more when local news, sports and weather are excluded.

In sharp contrast to the situation in radio, television and film, music, dance and the graphic arts have remained distinctly Caribbean in their motif, idiom and inspiration. The calypso prospers in Trinidad and the eastern Caribbean, and while the audience is universal, the best performers remain subjects of that region. The Steel Band is an authentic Trinidad musical instrument whose practice and public are expanding in Europe and North America but whose ambience is as thoroughly Trinidadian as the Scarlet Ibis in the Caroni swamps. The Ska and Reggae music, born in the less privileged areas of Western Kingston, Jamaica, now resonate throughout Europe, Africa, North America and Australia. Beryl McBurnie’s “Little Carib Theater Movement” and Rex Nettleford’s “Jamaica National Dance Company” draw their inspiration almost entirely from the history of the peoples of the Caribbean. The expansion and general acceptance of these arts forms would have been accomplished with or without the expanding influence of the United States in the Caribbean, associated as they are with the politics and economies of the region. Nevertheless, all of these forms owe to some degree, a part of their early success to the North American influence. The steel drums of the naval bases in Trinidad provided the “raw material” for the fabrication of the famous pans. Beryl MacBurnie studied at Columbia Teachers College in New York, where she admitted to being “influenced by Martha Graham at Columbia University and Charles Weidman at the Academy of Allied Arts.” But, as Molly Ahye shows in her study, *Cradle of Caribbean Dance*, MacBurnie taught as much as she learned, and her influence remains with groups such as the Alvin Ailey Dance Company.⁴⁷ And

⁴⁴*The Stateman’s Yearbook, 1977* (London: Macmillan, 1977).

⁴⁵See *The Baltimore Sun*, Thursday, January 28, 1982, 8. Geoffrey Himes, the author of this lucid and learned review claims Henzell has received very little of the enormous gross receipts of his film, and that he has not made another. All the other “exploitation films” are by non-Jamaicans.

⁴⁶Hosein, “Imported Television,” 7-25.

⁴⁷See Molly Ahye, *Cradle of Caribbean Dance* (Trinidad and Tobago: Heritage Cultures, 1983); Stephen Davis and Peter Simon, *Reggae International* (New York: Knopf, 1983); and Stephen Davis,

North American financial sponsorship, directly or indirectly, have been crucial elements of the Caribbean cultural renaissance of the post World War II period.

Americanized but not American

The emphasis on the paths of cultural penetration outlined above tends to exaggerate the receptivity of American culture on English Antillean society. That the impact of American mores and manners on Caribbean life is great cannot be denied. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that a major difference exists between being Americanized and being an American. The Anglophone Caribbean is steadily being Americanized; it is far, far from being American, however. This, indeed, is the point carefully made in another context by Everold Hosein, when he writes:

A generation of West Indians have grown up on the tradition of Hollywood Westerns but West Indians remain West Indians and not duplicates of John Wayne. The cultural impact of foreign programs is to be seen somewhat exaggerated. The impact is perhaps no greater (and probably less) than the impact of the introduction of electricity, refrigeration, and indoor plumbing. Our culture and lifestyle are perhaps affected more by the aeroplane, tourism, the travels of our civil servants, the return of overseas-trained doctors, engineers, lawyers and technicians. The lifestyle reflected by the former ruling expatriate class is an important factor in explaining what consumption standards the society chooses now to live by.⁴⁸

It might be appropriate, then, to examine some factors inhibiting U.S. cultural penetration of the Anglophone Antilles. For it remains surprising—at least to this writer—how selective the adaptations made by the English Caribbean societies from North America have been. Despite their proximity, and the enthusiasm for sports which both societies exhibit, English West Indians have been less than overwhelming in their zeal to adapt the major North American summer sport of baseball, or the winter sports of American football or basketball. Good explanations are not easily established. West Indians seem to favor the sport as spectators when they are in the United States; and the reception of these sports in the Hispanic Caribbean, Central America and Japan, would certainly question any explanations based on ethnic, biological or geographical reasons. Baseball, after all, does utilize many of the physical skills of cricket. Yet the ardor for baseball found in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic is absent in Jamaica, Barbados or any of the other neighboring territories. Similarly, while boxing is popular, there has been a singular lack of popularity for American football outside the fanciful ambience of carnival. Sports is an integral part of culture, and the singular lack of success in transferring North American sports to the Caribbean—compared with the difficult saga of promoting soccer in the U.S.—reflects on the nature and values of Caribbean society.⁴⁹

“Jamaican Politics, Economics and Culture. An Interview with Edward Seaga,” *Caribbean Review*, Vol. X, No. 4 (Fall 1981): 14-17.

⁴⁸Hosein, “Imported Television,” 11.

⁴⁹C.L.R. James deals with the point fleetingly in *Beyond a Boundary* (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1963). See especially Chapter 3, “Old School-Tie.” The point is also made implicitly by George Lamming in “I do not sleep to dream: Education, History and Society: A Caribbean Perspective,” *Caliban*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall-Winter 1980), 103-8. This was the address delivered on Lamming’s acceptance of an honorary degree at the University of the West Indies, Cave Hill, February 6, 1980. On sports in the United States see Christopher Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism* (New York: Norton, 1978), especially 100-24; John Rikards Betts, *America’s Sporting Heritage: 1850-1950* (Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1974); and Frederick W. Cozens, and Florence S. Stumpf, *Sports in American Life* (New York: Arno Press, 1976).

Caribbean societies are extremely complex, and nowhere is this more manifest than in the matter of class and race. This is the point that visitors and foreign bureaucrats often miss entirely or fail to appreciate fully. Cultural adaptation, therefore, varies along the cleavages created by socio-economic class distinctions as well as by education. Class alliances and education also affect patterns of behavior. In addition, not only are the societies complex, in their composition and in their patterns of conduct, they are also extremely paradoxical. While being eternally revolutionary, they are consistently conservative. They are essentially eclectic yet basically stable. The constant influx of new modes may accompany the perseverance of the old modes. Moreover, until World War II these societies were changing at a very slow pace.

One definite inhibiting quality of the English West Indian society has been their Anglo-European view of the world which has resisted the acceptance of certain aspects of American life and modes of conduct until the middle years of the twentieth century. Although the societies remained predominantly African in their ethnic heritage, centuries of English colonial rule left an indelible impression on the English Caribbean territories and their cultural values. This was true among all classes from the elite down to those which George Lamming has so eloquently referred to as “an uncertified mass of ordinary people.”⁵⁰ This English influence, or bias, is what the novelist V.S. Naipaul deplures, especially, but not only, in *The Mimic Men*, although he hardly does justice to it.⁵¹ Naipaul’s malicious attitude toward the foibles of English West Indian society contrasts sharply with that of the veteran Trinidadian writer, C.L.R. James, as he reflected on the legacy of his pro-English “education” in *Beyond a Boundary*, one of the finest books written not only about West Indian cricket, but also about West Indian society and culture:

In 1938 I went to the United States. At that time...my attitude to the code (of loyalty to the old school) was not merely critical. It was, if anything, contemptuous. I had said goodbye to all that. I didn’t know how deeply the early attitudes had been ingrained in me and how foreign they were to other peoples until I sat at baseball matches with friends, some of them university men, and saw and heard the howls of anger and rage and denunciation which they hurled at the players as a matter of course. I could not understand them and they could not understand me either—they asked anxiously if I were enjoying the game. I was enjoying the game; it was they who were disturbing me.⁵²

The attitude of James reflected that of the upwardly mobile, sensitive, articulate and informed middle classes, albeit of a generation fast fading from the Caribbean scene. His observation pinpoints one of the cardinal general differences between the English Caribbean and the United States in the attitude toward sports. In the Caribbean except, possibly, in the case of horseracing, great emphasis is placed on participation in sports, regardless of the degree of proficiency. This goes back a long way in Caribbean life. Frank Cundall in *Jamaica in 1928* described the variety of sports available to the visitor in that island—horseracing, polo, cricket, lawn tennis, golf, soccer, hockey, croquet, rifle-shooting, bicycle-riding, field and track, yachting, swimming,

⁵⁰George Lamming, foreword to Walter Rodney, *A History of the Guyanese Working People, 1881-1905* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins, 1981), Preface, xvii.

⁵¹V.S. Naipaul, *The Mimic Men* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1967). See Gordon Lewis’ comment in “The Caribbean,” *Caribbean Review*, Vol. X, No. 4 (1981): 19: “And that is to be expected, for Naipaul, for all his real fits, is not interested in the central mass of the West Indian masses and classes, but only in its marginal types and, even more, only in its failed marginal type. Every Naipaul novel, indeed, is a treatment of failure in the colonial and post-colonial society. He is the East Indian snob enjoying the Western European high-life style, with his real gifts devoted to the asinine proposition that the West Indies have created nothing.”

⁵²James, *Beyond a Boundary*, 51-2.

shooting and fishing.⁵³ These were also popular sports in England at the time. The West Indian spectators of sports often included individuals who possessed a wide range of skills of the particular sport being watched. This contrasts sharply with the North American concept where a few highly skilled performers entertain a crowd of usually non-athletic types whose spectating is accompanied by a variety of other activities of the gastronomic sort.

Yet the impressionable aspirant middle class which produced the type of a C.L.R. James was not, until after the 1940s, the dominant class in the West Indies. Until the middle of the twentieth century, the elite comprised the intellectually limited descendants of a closed group described by Lady Maria Nugent and Mrs. Carmichael in the early nineteenth century.⁵⁴ Although a large number of these people got their education in England, they were hardly sterling representatives of English society or English culture. Bridget Brereton wrote that in Trinidad “the white society was curiously isolated from the wider island milieu. It seemed possible to ignore the existence of non-whites, except as domestics and laborers.”⁵⁵ In *Jamaica Farewell*, Morris Cargill, a liberal member of the group, leaves a scathing denunciation of that class:

My Uncle Sidney was a competent lawyer and totally trustworthy financially and professionally. He was a snob and a narrow-minded bore, quite incapable of seeing anyone’s point of view but his own. The first time I went to dinner at his house, a week or two after arriving home, I was treated to a long lecture interrupted only by loud comments upon niggers, a subject upon which he considered himself an authority. It was hard to imagine, he told us, but he had heard of some “brown boy” buying a car. “If we don’t watch out,” he said, “niggers will soon be owning cars, if you please.” He was sick of niggers who did not know their place.... I was soon to learn that this habit of downgrading and insulting the Negro race in general in the hearing of Negro servants was widespread among Jamaican whites.⁵⁶

It was not likely that the small, closed, unrepresentative group to which the Cargills belonged would be, or could be, receptive to any form of American influence, especially with its emphasis on the masses (which in Jamaica and the rest of the English Caribbean were black) and on materialism. The Cargills, however, were not just a decadent group. They were a dying class, incapable of accepting or accommodating the new order of things which the post-World War II years ushered into the Caribbean. The local social and political revolutions were accompanied by a more aggressive, though inconsistent, attempt by the United States to export its cultural influence overseas. As Emily Rosenberg describes it, the Americans began a new “cultural offensive” in the late 1930s:

To internationalists, the resultant rollback of America’s cultural influence in the 1930s, resulting from both domestic financial restraints and foreign restrictions, only confirmed their beliefs in the indivisibility of a liberal order. American trade and investment seemed to increase or decline along with the expansion and contraction of its communications and culture. If American values were to uplift

⁵³Frank Cundall, *Jamaica in 1928* (London: Institute of Jamaica, 1928), 80-88.

⁵⁴*Lady Nugent’s Journal of Her Residence in Jamaica from 1801 to 1805* (1907). A new and revised edition, edited by Philip Wright (Kingston, Jamaica: Institute of Jamaica, 1966); A.C. Carmichael, *Domestic Manners and Social Condition of the White, Coloured and Negro Population of the West Indies* (London: Whittaker, Treacher, 1833).

⁵⁵Bridget Brereton, *Modern Trinidad*, 121; see also Michael Anthony, *The Making of Port-of-Spain* (Port-of-Spain, Trinidad: National Cultural Council, 1978), 150-1.

⁵⁶Cargill, *Jamaica Farewell*, 93-94.

the world, then so, it seemed, must its capital and its products; and if its goods and capital were to circulate freely, so must American ideas.⁵⁷

Conclusion

The post war years provided a great opportunity for the rapid dissemination of American ideas throughout the Caribbean. By then English colonialism and the declining class which has supported it were fading fast, and increased trade and communications between the area and the North American mainland meant that American ideas and values could be introduced, quite literally, into the homes of the English West Indian people. What remains surprising, therefore, is not how much the Anglophone Caribbean has been Americanized, but, given the circumstances, how little. The past inhibiting factors have largely been political, social and economic. But these have been changing at an ever increased pace. In the English Caribbean the basic institutions were established by the English and English influence prevailed even after the withdrawal of empire. The same was true for the French Antilles. But in the Spanish Antilles those basic institutions did not get the same initial impetus from the Spanish metropolis, and so after 1900 the North Americans were able to supply the foundations of their new society at a critical point in their evolution. Nevertheless, the contemporary English Antillean societies remain in a state of flux, and the past may no longer provide a good indication of future events and future action.

⁵⁷Rosenberg, *American Dream*, 203. See also, Irwin F. Gellman, *Good Neighbor Policy. United States Policies in Latin America 1933-1945* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins, 1979), 142-55.

Table I
Tourism in the Anglophone Caribbean, 1980

State	Per Capita GNP in \$US	Population	Tourist Receipts as % of GNP
Antigua	1,070	74,000	46.0
Bahamas	2,780	231,000	87.0
Barbados	2,400	253,000	31.0
Belize	1,030	131,000	5.0
Grenada	630	108,000	21.0
Guyana	570	843,000	N.A.
Jamaica	1,240	2,184,000	7.0
St. Kitts/Nevis	780	44,404	15.0
St. Lucia	780	122,000	35.0
St. Vincent	490	106,000	18.0
Trinidad/Tobago	3,390	1,152,000	2.0
U.S.A.	10,820	223,186,000	0.5

Source: *Wilson Quarterly* (Spring 1982), 126.

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